Adapting Software Testing Techniques for Hardware Errors

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# Abstract

With the end of conventional CMOS scaling, efficient re- siliency solutions are needed to address the increased like- lihood of hardware errors. Silent data corruptions (SDCs) are especially harmful because they can create unacceptable output without the user’s knowledge. Several resiliency anal- ysis techniques have been proposed to identify SDC-causing instructions, but they remain too slow for practical use and/or sacrifice accuracy to improve analysis speed.

We develop Minotaur, a novel toolkit to improve the speed and accuracy of resiliency analysis. The key insight behind Minotaur is that modern resiliency analysis has many con- ceptual similarities to software testing; therefore, adapting techniques from the rich software testing literature can lead to principled and significant improvements in resiliency analysis. Minotaur identifies and adapts four concepts from software testing: 1) it introduces the concept of *input quality criteria* for resiliency analysis and identifies PC coverage as a simple but effective criterion; 2) it creates (fast) *minimized inputs* from (slow) standard benchmark inputs, using the input qual- ity criteria to assess the goodness of the created input; 3) it adapts the concept of test case prioritization to *prioritize error injections* and invoke *early termination* for a given instruction to speed up error-injection campaigns; and 4) it further adapts test case or *input prioritization* to accelerate SDC discovery across multiple inputs.

We evaluate Minotaur by applying it to Approxilyzer, a state-of-the-art resiliency analysis tool. Minotaur’s first three techniques speed up Approxilyzer’s resiliency analysis by

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10.3X (on average) for the workloads studied. Moreover, they identify 96% (on average) of all SDC-causing instructions explored, compared to 64% identified by Approxilyzer alone. Minotaur’s fourth technique (input prioritization) enables identifying all SDC-causing instructions explored across mul- tiple inputs at a speed 2.3X faster (on average) than analyzing each input independently for our workloads.

***Keywords*** Hardware reliability; Resiliency analysis; Silent data corruption (SDC); Fault tolerance; Software testing; Cov- erage metrics; Input minimization and prioritization

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# Introduction

As we approach the end of CMOS scaling, hardware is becom- ing increasingly susceptible to errors in the field [[14](#_bookmark48), [19](#_bookmark53), [27](#_bookmark61), [96](#_bookmark130), [111](#_bookmark146), [134](#_bookmark168)]. Commodity hardware is used in systems with a range of reliability requirements, from entertainment devices to stringently safety-critical systems such as self-driving cars. This hardware is also used at multiple scales, from small embedded systems to large-scale high-performance comput- ing systems where the sheer scale demands extremely low failure rate for individual components. Traditional reliability solutions, relying on indiscriminate redundancy in space or time, are too expensive for such systems. Therefore, there has been significant research in cross-layer solutions [[22](#_bookmark56), [26](#_bookmark60)] that rely on the software layers of the system stack to provide acceptable end-to-end system resiliency for hardware errors at lower cost than hardware-only solutions [[31,](#_bookmark65) [32,](#_bookmark66) [95,](#_bookmark129) [134].](#_bookmark168) Early work recognized that a large majority of hardware errors were either masked at the software level (i.e., they did not change the output of the executing program) or resulted

in easily detectable anomalous software behavior (e.g., ex- ceptions due to unaligned or out-of-bounds addresses) [[29](#_bookmark63), [38](#_bookmark72), [50](#_bookmark84), [67](#_bookmark101), [89](#_bookmark123), [98](#_bookmark132), [120](#_bookmark155)]. The former errors require no ac- tion and the latter can be detected using zero to very low- cost detection mechanisms. While such software-centric re- siliency techniques show immense promise, unfortunately, some hardware errors escape detection and result in unde- tected and potentially unacceptable silent data corruptions (*SDCs*) of the program output.

Such SDCs have been an obstacle in the widespread adop- tion of software-centric resiliency techniques; therefore, sig- nificant recent research has focused on characterizing and reducing these SDCs either through hardware solutions (e.g., use of ECC in hardware memory structures) or software solu- tions (e.g., insertion of software checks in application code regions determined to be too vulnerable to SDCs) [[9](#_bookmark43), [22](#_bookmark56), [30](#_bookmark64), [35,](#_bookmark69) [48,](#_bookmark82) [60,](#_bookmark94) [66,](#_bookmark100) [70,](#_bookmark104) [73,](#_bookmark107) [88,](#_bookmark122) [92,](#_bookmark126) [98,](#_bookmark132) [113].](#_bookmark148)

Underlying all of these solutions is the need for techniques that find SDCs in the applications of interest. We use *software resiliency* or just *resiliency* to mean the ability of a given piece of software to avoid an SDC for a given hardware error. We use *resiliency analysis* to mean the process of characterizing the resiliency of a given piece of software for a given set of hardware errors. We use *resiliency hardening* to mean soft- ware modifications (with or without accompanying hardware modifications) to make the software more resilient. This paper concerns techniques for fast and accurate resiliency analysis. Prior work in resiliency analysis imposes a significant trade-off between speed and accuracy – statistical analy- ses based on dynamic error-free execution traces or static code [[34](#_bookmark68), [68](#_bookmark102), [78](#_bookmark112), [80](#_bookmark114), [113](#_bookmark148)] are unable to precisely model error propagation paths; randomized error injection cam- paigns [[18](#_bookmark52), [54](#_bookmark88), [64](#_bookmark98), [109](#_bookmark144), [122](#_bookmark157)] provide only statistical infor- mation and are unable to predict resilience for code portions where errors were not injected; and more systematic and com- prehensive error-injection techniques [[49](#_bookmark83), [107](#_bookmark142), [117](#_bookmark152)] precisely identify SDC-causing instructions but are much slower than the previous techniques. Section [7](#_bookmark34) describes prior work in

more detail.

This paper presents Minotaur, a toolkit that improves the speed of resiliency analyses while also precisely identifying more SDC-causing instructions (program counters) or *SDC- PCs*. The novel insight behind Minotaur is that analyzing software for resiliency to hardware errors is similar to testing software for software bugs; therefore, adapting techniques from the rich software testing literature can lead to principled and significant improvements in resiliency analysis. Mino- taur can benefit many resiliency analysis techniques; here we evaluate it by applying it to the state-of-the-art Approxilyzer tool [[116,](#_bookmark151) [117].](#_bookmark152)

We identify, adapt, and evaluate four bridges between soft- ware testing and resiliency analysis:

**Concept 1: Test-Case Quality Input Quality**. A key concept in software testing is test-case (input) quality; i.e.,

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an input’s effectiveness in finding bugs in the target soft- ware. Several input quality criteria have been proposed in the literature, typically at the source-code level, with statement coverage as a simple and widely used criterion (Section [2.1.1).](#_bookmark3) Resiliency analysis typically uses generic inputs often devel- oped for performance evaluation; e.g., the reference inputs in benchmark suites. These generic inputs could be sub-optimal for discovering code vulnerable to SDCs, but there is no ac- cepted input-quality criterion for resiliency analysis.

This work introduces the notion of input-quality criteria for resiliency analysis, adapts several widely used software testing criteria to the object-code level, and evaluates these criteria for resiliency analysis. We find that *program counter (PC) coverage*, an analog of the widely used statement cov- erage, is an effective input-quality criterion for resiliency analysis. Intuitively, PC coverage measures the fraction of assembly instructions executed for a given input.

**Concept 2: Test-Case Minimization Input Minimiza- tion.** Test-case minimization for software takes a high quality, expensive/slow test and creates a cheaper/faster test with sim- ilar high quality. Minotaur adapts minimization to resiliency analysis by creating minimized inputs (referred to as *Min*) that are smaller and execute faster than, but have similar quality as, the reference inputs (*Ref* ).

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We apply minimization to seven benchmarks and show that using Min instead of Ref speeds up resiliency analysis by 4.1X on average. Min also finds 96% of all SDC-PCs identified by either Ref or Min. However, Ref only finds 64% of these SDC- PCs. This surprising result that Min is more accurate[1](#_bookmark0) than Ref parallels recent work from the software testing literature on bug detection [[40](#_bookmark74)]. Intuitively, Min can improve accuracy because it can be analyzed more comprehensively due to the improved analysis speed, whereas Ref can be prohibitively expensive to analyze in its entirety [[49,](#_bookmark83) [117].](#_bookmark152)

**Concept 3: Test-Case Prioritization Error-Injection Prioritization.** Test-case prioritization for software system- atically prioritizes test cases to find critical software failures as early as possible. Minotaur adapts test-case prioritization in two ways—prioritization of error injections for a given PC with a given input (Concept 3) and prioritization of inputs (Concept 4). In both cases, once a PC is found to generate an SDC, no further error injections are performed on that PC because it needs to be hardened anyway.

→

We explore several priority orderings for error injections for a given PC. Surprisingly, we find that random ordering reveals SDCs almost as quickly as an oracular best case. Further investigation shows that an SDC-PC often produces SDCs

1The accuracy of a binary classifier is typically measured as the ratio of the identified true positives (SDC-PCs for our case) and true negatives relative to the total population with known outcomes. We focus only on the identification of SDC-PCs and assume Approxilyzer’s error-injection based methodology results in no false positives. Therefore, we measure accuracy of Min (or Ref) as the ratio of SDC-PCs identified by Min (or Ref) relative to all the known SDC-PCs; i.e., the union of the SDC-PCs identified by Min and Ref. With this interpretation, accuracy is equivalent to *recall* [[45].](#_bookmark79)

for a very large number of its injections; therefore, a random ordering quickly finds one such injection. The combination of random ordering and termination of injections on a PC after an SDC discovery, combined with input minimization, provides an average 10.3X speedup (up to 38.9X) in resiliency analysis time by employing Minotaur.

**Concept 4: Test-Case Prioritization Input Prioritiza- tion.** We also adapt test-case prioritization across multiple inputs. To find SDC-PCs as fast as possible, we prioritize resiliency analysis on the faster Min input over the slower Ref input. Then, for higher accuracy, we can additionally perform resiliency analysis on the larger Ref input, but only for the PCs not already classified as SDCs by Min. This pri- oritization of *inputs* for resiliency analyses results in finding the union of SDC-PCs across both inputs, while running on average 2.3X faster than analyzing both inputs independently in their entirety.

→

**To summarize**, Minotaur shows, for the first time, that leveraging software testing concepts for resiliency analysis enables principled and significant benefits in speed and accu- racy. While our evaluation uses Approxliyzer as the underly- ing resiliency analysis, Minotaur and its concepts apply more generally (Section [7).](#_bookmark34) For example, Concepts 1 and 2 can be applied to speed up any dynamic resiliency analyses that typically study large inputs, by producing a smaller represen- tative input for analysis. Error-injection analyses can greatly benefit from Concept 3, by prioritizing error-injections and employing early termination for SDC-PCs. Concept 4 can propel resiliency analyses to explore multiple inputs, a new direction which previously was daunting due to speed and accuracy concerns of existing techniques. Minotaur provides a foundation for a systematic methodology for efficient re- siliency analysis based on software testing, and opens up many avenues for further research.

# Background

This section provides an overview of the relevant software test- ing techniques adapted by Minotaur and of Approxilyzer [[117](#_bookmark152)].

## Relevant Software Testing Techniques

Software testing is the process of executing a program or system with the intent of finding failures [[81](#_bookmark115)]. The objective of testing can be quality assurance, verification, validation, or reliability estimation. We discuss some techniques and best practices adopted by the software testing community.

## Test-Case Quality

In software testing, a *test case* is an input and an expected output used to determine whether the system under test satis- fies some software testing objective. A *test set* is a collection of test cases. The number of all test cases can be intractably large. Thus, selecting appropriate test cases has a significant impact on testing cost and effectiveness. Test cases are se- lected by evaluating them using quality criteria relevant to the testing objectives.



**Figure 1.** A classification of error outcomes [[117](#_bookmark152)]. Only out- comes of SDC-Bad and SDC-Maybe constitute SDC-PCs.

Selecting a quality criterion involves a tradeoff. A “stronger” criterion enables closer scrutiny of program be- havior to find bugs, while a “weaker” criterion can be fulfilled using fewer test cases [[93](#_bookmark127)]. The choice of criterion depends on several factors, including the size of the program, cost requirements, and criticality of failure. Some popular crite- ria [[93](#_bookmark127)], ordered from weaker to stronger, are: (1) statement coverage [[7](#_bookmark41)], which measures the fraction of program state- ments executed by tests; (2) branch coverage [[81](#_bookmark115)], which measures the fraction of branch edges executed; and (3) def- use coverage [[37](#_bookmark71), [93](#_bookmark127)], which measures the fraction of pairs of variable definitions and their corresponding uses executed. Despite being a weak criterion, statement coverage is typ- ically used for testing commercial software due to its low resource overheads. Branch coverage is often used for safety- critical systems [[36](#_bookmark70)]. The software testing literature provides an extensive analysis of various testing criteria [[7].](#_bookmark41)

## Test-Case Minimization

While running larger (or more) test cases is desirable for thorough testing, time and resources limit the size (or num- ber) of test cases that can be executed. *Test-case minimiza- tion* is used to minimize the testing cost in terms of execu- tion time [[6](#_bookmark40), [39](#_bookmark73), [40](#_bookmark74), [94](#_bookmark128), [130](#_bookmark165)–[132](#_bookmark166)]. The goal is to generate a smaller test case that has similar or (ideally) the same quality as the original test case; e.g., covers the same statements.

## Test-Case Prioritization

Resource constraints can sometimes make it infeasible to execute all planned test cases. It thus becomes necessary to prioritize and select test cases so that critical failures can surface sooner rather than later [[130](#_bookmark165)]. Test-case prioritization techniques schedule test cases in an order that allows the most important tests, by some measure, to execute first. For example, test-cases can be prioritized by their coverage. Many test-case prioritization techniques have been proposed in the literature [[130].](#_bookmark165)

## Approxilyzer

We evaluate Minotaur using Approxilyzer [[116](#_bookmark151), [117](#_bookmark152)], a state- of-the-art instruction-level resiliency analysis tool that is fine- grained (it identifies individual SDC-PCs) and comprehensive (it analyzes nearly all instructions). Approxilyzer uses a com- bination of program analysis and error injections to determine

**Application Input**

**Input Quality Checker**

**1**

**Input Quality Target (Criterion + Threshold)**

**1 Input quality 2 Input minimization 3 Error-injection prioritization 4 Input prioritization**

**Minimization Objective**

**Minimizer**

**2**

**Input Constraints**

**Resiliency Analyzer**

**APPROXILYZER**

 **3**

**Resiliency Analysis Output**

**Input Selector**

**4**

**Input Prioritization Objective**

// INPUT: c = True

// Source. 100% Statement Coverage

1. v = c ? E1 : E2 // covered

// Assembly. 75% PC Coverage

PC-1. beq c, $0, L2 # covered L1: PC-2. move v, E1 # covered PC-3. jump L3 # covered

L2: PC-4. move v, E2 # not covered

L3: …

**Figure 2.** Overview of Minotaur. Approxilyzer may be re- placed with another resiliency analyzer.

the outcome of a single-bit transient hardware error occur- ring during the execution of any dynamic instruction—in any source or destination register bit of the instruction—of the given program and its input. We use *error site* to refer to the combination of the dynamic instruction instance and its register bit that incurs the error.

Approxilyzer dramatically reduces the number of required error injections to predict the error outcome for all applica- tion error sites for a given input. It systematically analyzes all error sites, and carefully picks a small subset to perform selective error injections. It uses novel error-site pruning tech- niques (pioneered by Relyzer [[49](#_bookmark83)]) to reduce the number of error-sites needing detailed study, either by predicting their outcomes or showing them equivalent to other errors. To prune error sites, Approxilyzer partitions error sites into *equivalence classes* such that the error outcome ofa single representative of each class is needed to predict error out- come for all error sites in the class. However, it is still slow, requiring millions of error injections for standard benchmarks with reference inputs [[117](#_bookmark152)]. Past studies, therefore, performed error injections only for the classes that contain 99% of the error sites (sorted by equivalence class size), referred to as 99% *error-site coverage*—analyzing the last 1% was deemed too expensive, because it can involve many more classes and would require many more error injections [[49,](#_bookmark83) [117].](#_bookmark152)

Approxilyzer distinguishes error-injection outcomes as masked, detected, or output corruptions (OCs). While most prior work considers all OCs as SDCs, Approxilyzer analyzes the quality (degradation) of the corrupted outputs to further differentiate between output corruptions that are tolerable to the user from those that are not. A comprehensive list of error outcomes follows, also summarized in Figure [1:](#_bookmark4)

**Detected**: An error that raises observable symptoms and can hence be caught using various low-cost detectors [[98](#_bookmark132)] before the end of execution.

•

**DDC**: An OC that is detectable via low-cost mechanisms such as range detectors applied on the output [[48].](#_bookmark82)

•

**SDC-Bad**: An OC with very large (unacceptable) output quality degradations.

•

**SDC-Maybe**: An OC that may be tolerable if the output- quality degradation is within a user-provided acceptability threshold (if no threshold is provided, all SDC-Maybe’s default to SDC-Bad).

•

**Figure 3.** Statement coverage vs. PC coverage.

**SDC-Good**: An OC that produces negligibly small (and acceptable) output quality degradations.

•

* **Masked**: Errors that produce no output corruption.

To identify an SDC-PC, Approxilyzer examines the error outcomes for all error sites in a given static PC. If even a single error site results in an unacceptable outcome (SDC-Bad or SDC-Maybe for quality degradations outside the acceptability threshold), the PC is classified as an SDC-PC. Because SDC- Good outcomes are tolerable, their error sites do not need hardening and do not contribute to SDC-PCs.

# Minotaur

This section describes Minotaur, a novel toolkit for principled and efficient resiliency analysis for hardware errors. Figure [2](#_bookmark6) illustrates the complete system.

## Input Quality

Ensuring that "good" quality inputs are used for resiliency analysis increases the effectiveness of the analysis. We adapt the concept of test-case quality (Section [2.1.1)](#_bookmark3) to build an *Input Quality Checker* (Figure [2)](#_bookmark6) that measures the quality of the inputs used for resiliency analysis.

The software test quality criteria are typically expressed at the source-code level, to make it easier for developers to understand what is covered and what is not. There has also been some work on test coverage at the object-code level [[13](#_bookmark47), [17](#_bookmark51)], but it is not widely studied. Our resiliency analysis examines error models at the object code level and aims to find assembly instructions that are vulnerable to SDCs (SDC-PCs). Hence, it is desirable to measure the quality of the input used for resiliency analysis with quality criteria expressed at the object code.

Figure [3](#_bookmark7) demonstrates the difference between using input quality criteria at the source vs. object code level. Suppose a ternary operator is used by the developer, such as in Line 1. Assuming a value of *True* for the variable *c*, statement cover- age (Section [2.1)](#_bookmark2) of the source code measures that this single input will cover (execute) 100% of the code. However, for the same code compiled to assembly, only 75% of the instruc- tions are covered (executed). Analyzing resiliency with just this input does not provide full (100%) assembly instruction coverage, and an error in assembly instruction PC-4 would not be captured.

For resiliency analysis, we adapt three test (input) qual- ity criteria to the object code level—statement, branch, and def-use coverage. The analog of statement coverage at the object code level measures the fraction of static assembly instructions (or *PCs*) executed by the input; we call it simply *PC coverage*. Branch and def-use coverage are analogously adapted from the source to the object code level to consider assembly-level branches and def-uses pairs, respectively.

The Input Quality Checker (Box 1 in Figure [2)](#_bookmark6) evaluates whether a given input meets the desired *quality threshold* (e.g., 90%) for a specified *quality criterion* (e.g., PC coverage). We refer to the combination of the input quality criterion and the threshold as the *input quality target*.

## Input Minimization

Minimizing the input size can greatly speed up the resiliency analysis by reducing the time for each error-injection exper- iment and/or reducing the total number of error injections needed. Using insights from test-case minimization, we de- signed a systematic technique, a *Minimizer* (Box 2 in Fig- ure [2),](#_bookmark6) that Minotaur uses to generate a minimal input, *Min*, provided a reference input, *Ref*.

There is no general algorithm to minimize inputs across all application domains in software testing [[7](#_bookmark41)]. Our Minimizer algorithm is specialized for our workloads. Given a Ref, the goal of the Minimizer is to find a reduced input (Min) that minimizes a stated *minimization objective (MinObj)* (e.g., execution time) while satisfying an *input quality target* (e.g., 90% PC coverage relative to Ref). We chose a simple, greedy algorithm based on binary search for the Minimizer and found it effective. More sophisticated optimizers may find better Min inputs; we leave such an exploration to future work.

In addition to the minimization objective and input qual- ity target, the Minimizer is provided with the list of input parameters (e.g., command line and other program-specific parameters) and a set of parameter constraints (e.g, range or boundary conditions) to ensure that the Min generated is both legal and realistic. A realistic Min enables the resiliency analysis to uncover SDC-PCs that are vulnerable for realis- tic conditions, avoiding over- or under-protection. Domain knowledge enables understanding the realistic range of in- put values and how to change them (e.g., choosing image shrinking instead of sub-sampling pixels or subsetting image inputs [[58])](#_bookmark92) to achieve realistic inputs.

Algorithm [1](#_bookmark8) shows the pseudo-code of Minotaur’s Mini- mizer. It first performs a pre-processing pass over the refer- ence input’s parameter list and orders the parameters accord- ing to their estimated impact on the minimization objective. Our current implementation determines this order by running the program with a few different values for each input param- eter and measuring the impact on the minimization objective. This step can be accelerated with additional domain knowl- edge or automated using more sophisticated optimizers.

Given the ordered parameter list, the Minimizer uses binary search to progressively change each input parameter (one with

**Algorithm 1:** Input Minimization Pseudocode

**1** *PList*: Parameter List, *C*: Constraints,

**2** *IQT* : Input Quality Target, *MinOb j*: Minimization Objective,

**3** *PListRe f* : Reference input’s *PList*

**4 Function** *Minimizer(PListRe f , C, IQT, MinOb j)***:**

**5** *PList* ← *OrderParams*(*PListRe f , MinOb j*)

**6 for** *param* ∈ *PList* **do**

**7** *lower* ← Minimum value of *param* provided *C*

**8** *upper* ← Reference value of *param*

**9** *PList*[*param*]←

*BinarySearch*(*lower, upper, C, IQT* )

**10 end**

**11 return** *PList*

**12 Function** *OrderParams(PList, MinOb j)***:**

**13 return** Ordered parameters of *PList* with respect to

*MinOb j*

**14 Function** *BinarySearch(lower, upper, C, IQT)***:**

**15** Search values between *lower* and *upper* provided *C*,

**16** checking if the candidate value satisfies *IQT*

**17 return** minimum value that satisfies *IQT*

highest impact on the minimization objective first) while en- suring that the new input value meets the input quality target. Lines 6–10 of Algorithm [1](#_bookmark8) show this search for applications with (1) numeric inputs and (2) where reducing the value of input parameters reduces (or does not affect) the minimiza- tion objective. All applications we study (except Sobel, which takes as input an image) satisfy both characteristics, with binary search sufficing for the value exploration. We reduce images for Sobel using the *resize* utility in the ImageMagick suite [[69](#_bookmark103)], which accepts a numerical argument, adapting the binary search to adjust this argument. Similarly, other applica- tion domains could also require appropriate adaptation of the algorithm. At the end of this process, the Minimizer outputs the final parameter list for the minimized input.

## Error-Injection Prioritization

We next use insights from test-case prioritization to improve resiliency analysis for any input (minimized or not). We eval- uate *error-injection prioritizations* that order error injections for a PC such that error sites which are more likely to be SDC- causing are examined earlier. Once an injection reveals an SDC, Minotaur does not perform injections for any other error sites for that PC. Hence, error-injection prioritization can lead to *early termination* of error-injection campaigns, leading to significant savings. Box 3 of Figure [2](#_bookmark6) shows the application of error-injection prioritization in Minotaur’s workflow.

We study the following ordering schemes for error- injection prioritization to understand which error sites result in SDCs:

**Bit position of registers (BitPos)**: Injecting into specific bits first (such as the MSB or LSB).

•

**Dynamic instance of error site (DI)**: Error sites from an earlier dynamic instance may be more prone to SDCs than later dynamic instances.

•

**Register type (RT) – integer vs. floating point**: Cer- tain register types could be more susceptible to SDCs than others.

•

**Operand kind (OP) – source vs. destination**: Prioritizing source vs. destination register may also show a pattern for SDC-causing instructions.

•

**Equivalence class size (ECS)**: This ordering is specific to Approxilyzer and prioritizes injections in error sites of largest equivalence classes first, which is the default ordering used by Approxilyzer to maximize the number of error sites with predicted outcome for a given number of total error injections.

•

* **Random ordering**: Error sites are chosen at random.

## Input Prioritization

Mission-critical applications with high resiliency require- ments must undergo analysis using multiple inputs to build confidence that most SDC-PCs in the application have been identified. To that end, a naïve, but prohibitively expensive, scheme could analyze many inputs in their entirety to find all SDC-PCs in an application. Instead, we adapt test-case prioritization from software testing in the form of *input prior- itization* to speed up resiliency analysis for multiple inputs.

In our scheme, an *Input Selector* (Box 4 in Figure [2)](#_bookmark6) chooses inputs for resiliency analysis according to an order specified by an *input prioritization objective*. We choose to analyze the input with the shortest execution time, prioritizing faster analyses first (e.g., we choose Min before Ref). Input prioritization can lead to faster resiliency analysis speed for each subsequent input because the PCs already identified as SDC-PCs by prior inputs need not be (re)analyzed. Thus, we can leverage input-prioritization to find many of the SDC- PCs from one (faster) input, and carry this information onto another (slower but larger) input to avoid unnecessary error injections. Minotaur’s Input Selector can successively select inputs for resiliency analysis until it meets an analysis target (e.g., a coverage or resource target).

# Methodology

## Evaluation Infrastructure and Workloads

Our error-injection infrastructure builds on Approxi- lyzer [[117](#_bookmark152)], based on simulation using Wind River Sim- ics [[119](#_bookmark154)] and GEMS [[72](#_bookmark106)] running OpenSolaris. Our work- loads are compiled to the SPARC V9 ISA with all optimiza- tions enabled.

Approxilyzer’s error model uses single-bit architecture- level errors (Section [2.2),](#_bookmark5) which are a limited but effec- tive [[104](#_bookmark139)] and realistic subset of hardware errors [[24](#_bookmark58)]. With re- siliency becoming a first-class software design objective [[10](#_bookmark44)], techniques with different speed, precision, and error models

are needed at different stages of software development. Eval- uating Minotaur with tools that use different error models (lower-level, multi-bit, etc.) is part of our future work.

To evaluate Minotaur, we use seven workloads from three benchmark suites spanning multiple application domains, summarized in Table [1.](#_bookmark11) Column 4 lists the reference (Ref) in- put parameters used in our study. For five of the benchmarks— Blackscholes, Swaptions, LU, Water, and FFT—we use the same inputs as Approxilyzer [[117](#_bookmark152)] for the reference inputs. For Streamcluster, prior evaluations [[75](#_bookmark109), [110](#_bookmark145)] showed that the benchmark benefits from realistic datasets (as opposed to data points generated internally by the application); hence, we use a dataset from the UCI Machine-Learning Reposi- tory [[28](#_bookmark62), [52](#_bookmark86), [99](#_bookmark133)] as its Ref input. For Sobel, we use the bird image from the iACT [[76](#_bookmark110)] repository as input. We chose rela- tively small Ref inputs for almost all applications to be con- servative and not over-estimate the benefits of input minimiza- tion. To evaluate the quality of the outputs, we use the same metrics as Approxilyzer [[117](#_bookmark152)] for Blackscholes, Swaptions, LU, Water, and FFT; for Streamcluster and Sobel, we use max- imum relative error (*max-rel-err* from Approxilyzer [[117]).](#_bookmark152)

Evaluating Minotaur using the above workloads involved performing over 8.4 million error-injection experiments span- ning approximately seven weeks of simulation time on a 200-node cluster of 2.4GHz Intel Xeon processors.

## Input-Quality Criteria

Since no available tool can easily measure test coverage at the object-code level, we developed our own tools using dynamic traces from Simics [[119](#_bookmark154)] for PC, branch, and def-use coverage for the object code. For PC coverage, we simply track the PCs executed by the input. For branch coverage, we store the unique branch-target PC pairs that represent control edges exercised by the input. For def-use coverage, we analyze the definition and use of operand registers exercised by the input, and store unique PC pairs that represent a def-use edge. For all criteria, we measure Min’s coverage relative to Ref.

## Input Minimization

Minotaur uses application run time as the minimization ob- jective and targets 100% PC coverage (relative to Ref) as the input quality target when possible. We measure PC, branch, and def-use coverage for each Min *relative* to its correspond- ing Ref; e.g., if Min executes all PCs executed by its Ref, we consider it to have 100% PC coverage. Similarly, if Min exercises all branch-target and def-use pairs exercised by Ref, we consider it to have 100% branch and def-use coverage, respectively.

We choose PC coverage as our quality criterion because it is simple and fast to compute and it is the analog of the widely used statement coverage criterion for software testing (Sec- tion [2.1.1).](#_bookmark3) We find that the Min inputs generated using PC coverage are surprisingly effective (Section [5.1.3),](#_bookmark24) and also exhibit high (but not perfect) branch and def-use coverage.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Suite** | **Application** | **Domain** | **Ref Input** | **Min Input** | **PC (%)** | **Branch (%)** | **Def-Use (%)** |
| Parsec 3.0 [[12]](#_bookmark46) | Blackscholes [[12]](#_bookmark46) | Financial Modeling | 64K options | 21 options | 100 | 100 | 99.38 |
| Swaptions [[12]](#_bookmark46) | 16 options5000 simulations | 1 option1 simulation | 99.91 | 99.23 | 98.42 |
| Streamcluster [[12]](#_bookmark46) | Data Mining | centers = [10,20]num iterations = 3 | centers = [4,5]num iterations = 1 | 99.97 | 99.77 | 98.67 |
| SPLASH-2 [[124]](#_bookmark159) | LU [[124]](#_bookmark159) | Scientific Computing | 512x512 matrix16x16 block size | 16x16 matrix8x8 block size | 100 | 100 | 95.56 |
| Water [[124]](#_bookmark159) | 512 molecules | 216 molecules | 99.89 | 99.36 | 99.85 |
| FFT [[124]](#_bookmark159) | Signal Processing | 220 data points | 28 data points | 100 | 100 | 99.59 |
| ACCEPT [[101]](#_bookmark135) | Sobel [[101]](#_bookmark135) | Image Processing | 100% image size(321x481 pixels) | 25.25% image size(81x121 pixels) | 100 | 100 | 100 |

**Table 1.** Applications studied and key input parameters (the ones that changed during minimization) for Ref and Min. The last three columns show the coverage of Min relative to Ref for different input quality criteria.

## Accuracy Analysis

Minotaur uses input minimization to generate a Min that is a good representative of a Ref. We quantify Minotaur’s accuracy for a given input as the fraction of SDC-PCs found by the input (either Min or Ref) relative to the total number of SDC-PCs found by the union of both inputs.

To understand the sources of inaccuracy, we analyze the SDC-PCs identified by Min and Ref by grouping them into categories based on whether they were found by Ref, Min, or both. We further distinguish the cases where certain PCs are explored (i.e., analyzed for resiliency) by one input but not both inputs. The difference occurs when the targeted error- site coverage (Section [2.2)](#_bookmark5) is less than 100% and Minotaur chooses different PCs to meet that coverage for the two dif- ferent inputs. We use the term *explore* to convey that at least one error site for a PC was analyzed (for a given input) by Minotaur. If no error site for a PC was analyzed (for a given input), we say that the PC was *not explored* by the input. Note that *not explored* does not mean *not executed* by the input; it simply means that the PCs were not analyzed for resiliency.

We group the SDC-PCs into five categories:

1. **Common**: Both Min and Ref classify the PCs as SDC, which are considered accurately classified by both.
2. **MinSDC**: Min classifies these as SDC-PCs and Ref ex- plores them but does not classify them as SDC-PCs. Al- though Ref did not find these SDC-PCs, they are still candi- dates for hardening because they were found by a realistic Min input. Hence, these PCs are considered accurately classified by Min, but not by Ref.
3. **MinSDC+**: Min classifies these as SDC-PCs and Ref does not explore them. For similar reasons as MinSDC, this category is also considered accurately classified by Min, but not by Ref.
4. **RefSDC**: Ref classifies these as SDC-PCs and Min ex- plores them but does not classify them as SDC-PCs. These PCs are inaccurately classified by Min because relying only on Min’s analysis would leave these PCs unprotected.
5. **RefSDC+**: Ref classifies these as SDC-PCs and Min does not explore them. This category is also considered inaccu- rately classified by Min.

The error-injection prioritization scheme (Section [4.5)](#_bookmark13) does not affect accuracy because it finds the same set of SDC-PCs for an input as without the optimization, albeit faster. Employ- ing the input-prioritization scheme for all inputs (Section [4.6)](#_bookmark14) will result in 100% accuracy since input-prioritization obtains the union of SDC-PCs found by analyzing all inputs (while optimizing resiliency analysis speed).

## Error-Injection Prioritization

We explore 38 different error-injection prioritizations using combinations of the schemes from Section [3.3.](#_bookmark9) For BitPos, DI, and ECS schemes, we test both ascending (A) and descending

(D) ordering. We also explore compositional schemes. For example, BitPos\_A + ECS\_D first orders error injections by bit positions in ascending order (i.e., starting with the LSB), followed by ordering in descending equivalence class size. For RT and OP schemes, we simply pick the type/kind of register (e.g., *OPSrc* or *OPDest*) to prioritize.

To understand the bounds on the error-injection priori- tization gains, we also run an Oracle best and worst case. The best case assumes that the Oracle identifies an SDC-PC with a single injection. For the worst case, the Oracle picks (for each PC) all injections that are not SDC-causing before picking an SDC-causing injection, reducing the benefit of early termination.

## Input Prioritization

Our Input Selector prioritizes (faster) Min over Ref. Section [5](#_bookmark17) shows that while Min exhibits high accuracy (Section [4.4),](#_bookmark12) it misses a small number of SDC-PCs found only by Ref. To achieve 100% accuracy, resiliency analysis on Ref is run after resiliency analysis on Min completes, but *only* for PCs that Min did not find as SDCs (Section [3.4).](#_bookmark10)

## Runtime Analysis of Minotaur

We evaluate the time that Minotaur takes to perform resiliency analysis on a single input. The Input Quality Checker, Mini- mizer, and Input Selector (boxes 1, 2, and 4 in Figure [2)](#_bookmark6) take negligible time compared to the resiliency analysis (Approx- ilyzer) time (box 3); therefore, we focus on the resiliency analysis component.

Ideally, the runtime performance would be measured di- rectly by measuring all components of Approxilyzer and every error injection. However, this cannot be done precisely on a busy cluster which introduces variability between runs. We estimate the total runtime by measuring statistically sampled error injections and using formulas as follows.

The time for resiliency analysis for a given application and input (Ref or Min) depends on: (1) equivalence class genera- tion time (*tequiv*\_*class*\_*gen*) [[49](#_bookmark83), [117](#_bookmark152)], (2) total injections of each outcome category (*Imasked, Idet, IOC*) for a target error site cov- erage, and (3) the average error-injection runtime of each out- come category (*tmasked, tdet, tOC*). We measure the runtime for each category separately because it can be quite different; e.g., an OC error requires additional post-processing (compared to Masked) to quantify the error quality into Good/Maybe/Bad categories, while Detected outcomes involve simulator and OS overhead to report outcomes such as SegFaults.

We measure the runtime by sampling 1,000 error-injection experiments for each of masked, detected, and OC outcomes per application and input, excluding outliers in the top and bot- tom 2.5% of runs. The total samples correspond to a 99.8% confidence level with 5% error margin in timing measure- ments [[59].](#_bookmark93) The time for resiliency analysis is calculated as:

*TotalRuntime* = *tequiv*\_*class*\_*gen* + Σ*n In* × *tn* (1)

where each outcome type *n masked, det, OC* is weighted by the number of injections with that outcome and average injection runtime for that outcome.

∈ { }

In practice, error injections (the second term of Equation [1)](#_bookmark16) dominate the total runtime of resiliency analysis. Thus, even though *tequiv*\_*class*\_*gen* is much shorter for Min (order of min- utes) compared to Ref (order of hours), it is negligible com- pared to the total time of injection experiments.

All runs for Ref and Min begin with a checkpoint at the start of the region of interest (ROI), generally provided by the benchmarks, to avoid simulator startup cost and application initialization overhead. We break down the measurements into two components: the application runtime only inside the ROI, and the remaining runtime from the end of the ROI to the in- jection outcome. The latter runtime includes simulation over- heads, various file I/O, and analysis of the application output.

# Results

We evaluate Minotaur’s impact on a resiliency analysis tool, Approxilyzer [[117](#_bookmark152)], by analyzing (1) the speedup and accu- racy from a minimized input (Min) for resiliency analysis (Section [5.1);](#_bookmark19) (2) the speedup from error-injection prioritiza- tion with early termination (Section [5.2);](#_bookmark31) (3) the combined speedup from minimization and error-injection prioritization (Section [5.3);](#_bookmark30) and (4) the speedup from applying input priori- tization across multiple inputs (Section [5.4).](#_bookmark32)

**95% Error Sites 98% Error Sites 99% Error Sites 100% Error Sites**

**100%**

**R M R M R M R M R M R M R M R M**

**90%**

**Relative Number of Injections**

**80%**

**70%**

**60%**

**50%**

**40%**

**30%**

**20%**

**10%**

**0%**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Figure 4.** Number of error injections for different error-site coverage targets for each benchmark, relative to 100% error- site coverage for Ref (Ref100). R=Ref, M=Min.

## Input Minimization

* + 1. **Min Quality**

Table [1](#_bookmark11) shows the Min generated by applying Algorithm [1](#_bookmark8) to each Ref, using PC coverage as the input quality criterion. Most applications show a large reduction of input parameter values in Min (column 5), which translates to faster applica- tion runtimes relative to Ref (Section [5.1.2).](#_bookmark20)[2](#_bookmark0) Additionally, Min maintains very high PC coverage relative to Ref (column 6), which translates to high accuracy in finding SDC-PCs (Section [5.1.3).](#_bookmark24)

Not all workloads achieve a significant application speedup with the input quality threshold set to 100%. Slightly reducing the threshold by less than a percent, however, results in sub- stantially higher minimization for Swaptions, Streamcluster, and Water. We show that the PC coverage reduction does not impact Min’s accuracy significantly (Section [5.1.3),](#_bookmark24) while allowing Minotaur to benefit from running the faster Min (Section [5.1.2).](#_bookmark20)

The last two columns of Table [1](#_bookmark11) show the branch and def- use coverage of the generated Min (relative to Ref) and are discussed further in Section [5.1.4.](#_bookmark28)

## Minimization Speedup

Min typically runs faster than Ref because it has fewer dy- namic instructions, resulting in fewer error injections and a shorter runtime per injection.

Figure [4](#_bookmark18) shows the total number of error injections needed for resiliency analysis for an application, relative to analyzing 100% of Ref’s error sites (Ref100). Past studies found that targeting 100% error-site coverage was too expensive and so targeted just the top 99% of error sites (Ref99), as discussed in Section [2.2.](#_bookmark5) By using input minimization, achieving 100%

2Many of our Ref inputs are themselves relatively small; higher benefits are likely with larger Ref inputs.

**Application Runtime**

**Run Time**

**1**

**R M R M R M R M R M R M R M R M**

**Simulation Overhead**

**20**

**Min\_EIP**

**Min**

**Ref\_EIP**

𝐌𝐢**n** 𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐄𝐈𝐏 𝐑𝐞𝐟𝐄𝐈𝐏

38.9

**0.8**

**Relative Runtime (normalized)**

**15**

**0.6**

**Speedup**

**10**

**0.4**

**5**

**0.2**

**Ref**

**0 0**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Figure 5.** Average runtime per injection, normalized to Ref. Each set of three bars represents (from left to right) Masked, Detected, OC runtime (Section [4.7),](#_bookmark15) divided into application runtime and simulation overhead. R = Ref and M = Min.

error-site coverage is no longer elusive for many applica- tions. Figure [4](#_bookmark18) shows that for the Min inputs of Blackscholes, Swaptions, LU, and FFT, the number of error injections re- quired for 100% error site coverage (Min100) is comparable to the number of error injections for Ref99 Thus, for these applications, it becomes tractable to run resiliency analysis with Min100. The other applications (Water, Streamcluster, and Sobel) also reduce the number of error injections from Ref100 to Min100, but the total number is still very large, presenting a trade-off between resiliency-analysis runtime and error-site coverage. We choose to favor runtime and use 99% error-site coverage for these applications. Henceforth, we use the umbrella term Min (unless otherwise stated) to encompass Min100 for Blackscholes, Swaptions, LU, and FFT, and Min99 for Water, Streamcluster, and Sobel. We use Ref to refer to Ref99 for all applications.

Not only does Min require fewer error injections for most of our workloads, each individual injection runs faster com- pared to Ref. Figure [5](#_bookmark21) shows the average runtime per injection for Ref and Min for different outcome types (Masked, De- tected, and OC). Each bar is divided into the application run- time during the ROI (which begins after an application’s ini- tialization phase) and the simulation overhead (Section [4.7).](#_bookmark15) Min injections run 2.1X faster on average[3](#_bookmark0) than Ref for all outcome types for two primary reasons. First, the applica- tion runtime itself is faster (2.3X on average across outcome types) due to the smaller input. Second, for some applica- tions, the I/O and other simulation environment overhead is significantly reduced for Min (1.8X on average). This is most notable for LU and FFT, where a large output matrix is gener- ated for Ref but not for Min. The output matrix needs to be extracted for comparison and error classification (Figure [1).](#_bookmark4) Min’s smaller output matrices allow for faster post-processing,

3All averages in this paper refer to the arithmetic mean.

**Figure 6.** Min, Min*EIP*, and Ref*EIP* speedup relative to Ref.

**Common MinSDC MinSDC+ RefSDC RefSDC+**

**100%**

**90%**

**80%**

**70%**

**60%**

**SDC-PCs**

**50%**

**40%**

**30%**

**20%**

**10%**

**0%**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Figure 7.** Min and Ref accuracy. The Y-axis represents all SDC-PCs found by Min or Ref in an application.

further speeding up the resiliency analysis relative to Ref for these applications.

Figure [6](#_bookmark22) shows the total speedup obtained for Min (and the Minotaur optimizations discussed in the next sections). The first bar for each application shows the speedup from using a Min input relative to Ref. Overall, the combination of having fewer error sites and faster runtime per injection results in a 4.1X speedup for Min over Ref on average (up to 15.5X for FFT), with nearly all applications showing speedup. Even for the applications that do not show much speedup (Stream- cluster and Sobel), the Min inputs are more accurate than Ref inputs (they identify more SDC-PCs) and benefit from error- injection prioritization, as discussed in the next sections.

## Minimization Accuracy

Figure [7](#_bookmark23) shows the accuracy of Ref and Min for each applica- tion. The Y-axis corresponds to the union of SDC-PCs found by Ref or Min, distributed into the five accuracy categories (Section [4.4).](#_bookmark12) The results show that a majority of SDC-PCs are categorized in the same way by both Ref and Min (60% on average are *Common*). Further, a large number of PCs fall

**95% Error Sites 98% Error Sites 99% Error Sites 100% Error Sites**

**100%**

**R M R M R M R M R M R M R M R M**

**90%**

**80%**

**70%**

**PCs Explored**

**60%**

**50%**

**40%**

**30%**

**20%**

**10%**

**0%**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**Streamcluster**

**Average**

**Oracle\_best Oracle\_worst Random**

**ECS\_D BitPos\_D + ECS\_D BitPos\_A + ECS\_D DI\_A + ECS\_D RT\_Int OP\_Src**

**4**

**3**

**Speedup**

**2**

**1**

**0**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Sobel**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Figure 8.** Percentage of PCs explored for different error-site coverage targets. R = Ref, M = Min.

in the MinSDC and MinSDC+ categories (35% on average). These are SDC-PCs that Min finds that Ref misses – either due to misclassification by Ref (MinSDC) or due to the lack of exploration of that PC by Ref altogether (MinSDC+).

Figure [8](#_bookmark25) explains the surprising result of finding additional SDC-PCs over Ref in the MinSDC+ category. The Y-axis corresponds to the total number of static PCs explored for different error site coverage targets. Ref error sites, although much more than Min error sites (Section [5.1.2),](#_bookmark20) generally ex- plore fewer distinct PCs than Min at lower error site coverage targets. Figure [8](#_bookmark25) shows that, on average, for 99% error-site coverage (sorted by equivalence class size), Ref explores 55% of the static PCs explored by the union of Ref and Min, while Min explores 85%. Thus, it can still be advantageous to run resiliency analysis with Min for workloads such as Streamcluster and Sobel, even though the total analysis time is similar to that of running with Ref.

The remaining two categories, RefSDC and RefSDC+, re- flect a loss of accuracy for Min. For many workloads, there are no RefSDC+ because Min explores all the PCs explored by Ref. The RefSDC category is also small, but not insignifi- cant (4% on average). Upon further study of the misclassified PCs, we found that a majority of the mismatches occur at the boundary of SDC categories that distinguish if protection is needed or not. For example, in many cases Ref identifies a PC as SDC-Maybe, but Min identifies it as SDC-Good. Often the difference in output quality between these is less than 1%. Similarly, on the other end of the protection spectrum, there are many PCs that mismatch because Ref classified the PC as SDC-Bad but Min classified it as DDC.

Overall, Min shows significantly higher accuracy than Ref. Of the total SDC-PCs discovered, on average, Min finds 96% (the sum of Common, MinSDC, and MinSDC+ categories) while Ref finds only 64% (the sum of Common, RefSDC, and RefSDC+) of these SDC-PCs.

**Figure 9.** Min speedup with error-injection prioritization.

**Oracle\_best Oracle\_worst Random**

**ECS\_D BitPos\_D + ECS\_D BitPos\_A + ECS\_D DI\_A + ECS\_D RT\_Int OP\_Src**

**9**

**8**

**7**

**6**

**Speedup**

**5**

**4**

**3**

**2**

**1**

**0**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Figure 10.** Ref speedup with error-injection prioritization.

## Improving Min Selection Criteria

We studied branch and def-use coverage of Min (relative to Ref) to understand if these stronger criteria could have been used to generate an alternate Min that provides higher accuracy than PC coverage. Table [1](#_bookmark11) shows that the Min inputs generated using PC coverage already have very high branch and def-use coverage of 99.76% and 98.78%, respectively, relative to Ref. Further, as discussed, Min already finds 96% of the SDC-PCs discovered by the union of Ref and Min. Thus, the potential improvement from using the more complex criteria is limited.

Nevertheless, we isolated the branch-target and def-use pairs that were in Ref but not in Min to determine if they were responsible for the RefSDCs in Figure [7.](#_bookmark23) We found that none of the RefSDC PCs intersect with the isolated branch-target pairs and only four intersect with the def-use pairs (one each for Blackscholes and Swaptions and two for LU). A more

**1**

**Probability of SDC injection**

**0.8**

**0.6**

**0.4**

**0.2**

**0**

**1**

**Probability of SDC injection**

**0.8**

**0.6**

**0.4**

**0.2**

**Blackscholes**

**0 20 40 60 80 100**

**Number of error injections**

**LU**

**1**

**0.8**

**Probability of SDC injection**

**0.6**

**0.4**

**0.2**

**0**

**1**

**Probability of SDC injection**

**0.8**

**0.6**

**0.4**

**0.2**

**FFT**

**0 20 40 60 80 100**

**Number of error injections**

**Water**

## 5.3 Minimization Plus Injection Prioritization

This section discusses the benefits of combining input mini- mization with error injection prioritization. Figure [6](#_bookmark22) shows the speedup in resiliency analysis, relative to Ref, from (1) us- ing Min (discussed in Section [5.1.2),](#_bookmark20) (2) using Min with error injection prioritization (referred to as Min*EIP*), and (3) using Ref with error injection prioritization (Ref*EIP*). As previously discussed in Section [5.1.2,](#_bookmark20) using only Minotaur’s input mini- mization optimization for resiliency analysis provides a 4.1X average speedup (up to 15.5X) compared to Ref (first bar for each application in Figure [6).](#_bookmark22) Combining Minotaur’s input minimization optimization with error injection prioritization

**0 0**

results in an average speedup of 10.3X (up to 38.9X for FFT),

**0 20 40 60 80 100**

**Number of error injections**

**0 20 40 60 80 100**

**Number of error injections**

relative to Ref. In contrast, Ref

*EIP*

observes only a 3.8X av-

**Figure 11.** Cumulative probability (Y-axis) of picking an SDC-causing error injection within the first *n* injections (X-axis) for an SDC-causing PC.

comprehensive analysis would explore the entire control and data flow paths rooted at the isolated branch-target and def- use PCs in Ref to conclusively confirm whether the stronger criteria would add further accuracy. We leave such an analysis and exploration of even more complex input quality criteria (e.g., path coverage) to future work, given that our results already show that PC coverage provides an excellent sweet spot for simplicity, performance, and accuracy.

## Error-Injection Prioritization

We study 38 different error injection prioritization schemes (Section [4.5).](#_bookmark13) For brevity, we show results only for the 7 most effective schemes, in addition to the oracle best-case and oracle worst-case schemes.

Figures [9](#_bookmark26) and [10](#_bookmark27) show the speedup results for Min and Ref, respectively, for different error injection prioritization schemes with early termination enabled. The figures show a noticeable speedup for most cases for both Min and Ref. Random prioritization gains the best average speedup of 2.4X and 3.8X for Min and Ref (upto 3X and 8.1X), respectively, while also being very close to the oracle best-case.

To understand the surprising result that Random performs the best, Figure [11](#_bookmark29) plots the cumulative probability (averaged over all SDC-PCs) of choosing an SDC-causing error injec- tion after *n* error injections in an SDC-causing PC. Figure [11](#_bookmark29) shows only four applications using Ref input, but the trends are representative across the workloads and inputs. The figure shows that the probability of finding an SDC injection shoots up within the first few injections. Upon investigation, we un- cover an interesting insight – when a PC is SDC-causing, a large fraction of the injections in that PC result in an SDC outcome. Randomly choosing an injection therefore tends to quickly find an SDC for that instruction. Thus, we choose the Random error injection prioritization scheme for the remain- der of the evaluations in this paper.

erage speedup (up to 8.14X for LU) relative to Ref (third bar for each application in Figure [6](#_bookmark22) and also discussed in Section [5.2).](#_bookmark31)

Recall that the accuracy of Min*EIP* is the same as that of Min (Section [5.1.3).](#_bookmark24) Thus, in addition to Min*EIP* significantly outperforming Ref and Ref*EIP* on average, Min*EIP* has the added benefit of finding many SDC-PCs that were not found by Ref (and Ref*EIP*) – Min finds 96% of the total SDC-PCs while Ref finds 64%.

## 5.4 Input Prioritization

For safety-critical systems which may require even higher accuracy, Minotaur provides the additional optimization of *in- put prioritization*. This optimization can speed up the analysis of multiple inputs in an attempt to further improve SDC-PC identification without taking the performance hit of running resiliency analysis for each individual input in its entirety. Figure [12](#_bookmark33) shows the runtime of analyzing both Min*EIP* and Ref*EIP*, without and with input prioritization, normalized to the runtime of Min*EIP* (Section [5.3).](#_bookmark30)

The first bar for each application shows the runtime of em- ploying a naive input prioritization scheme, by simply running Min*EIP* followed by Ref*EIP* analyses in their entirety (Min*EIP*

+ Ref*EIP* in the figure). The second bar shows the runtime of running Min*EIP* and Ref*EIP* with input prioritization enabled. That is, Min*EIP* is first run in its entirety (which is relatively fast, as discussed in Section [5.3),](#_bookmark30) followed by Ref*EIP but only for PCs not identified as SDC-PCs* by Min*EIP*. Thus, input pri- oritization requires the second input (Ref*EIP* in our study) to run for only a fraction of the original resiliency analysis time. Figure [12](#_bookmark33) shows that without input prioritization, Min*EIP*

+ Ref*EIP* runs 3.7X slower than Min*EIP*. Using input prioriti- zation ((Min*EIP* + Ref*EIP*)*IP* in the figure) brings the analysis time to only 1.6X slower than Min*EIP*. Thus, leveraging input prioritization allows Minotaur to analyze both inputs 2.3X faster on average than analyzing each input alone in its en- tirety. By carrying over information from one input analysis to the next, Minotaur is capable of achieving 100% accuracy while running much quicker than previous techniques.

**10**

**Min\_EIP + Ref\_EIP**

**(Min\_EIP + Ref\_EIP)\_IP**

𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐄𝐈𝐏 + 𝐑𝐞𝐟𝐄𝐈𝐏

𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐄𝐈𝐏 + 𝐑𝐞𝐟𝐄𝐈𝐏 𝐈𝐏

**8**

**Runtime (relative to Min\_EIP)**

**6**

**4**

**2**

𝑴𝒊𝒏𝑬𝑰𝑷

**0**

**Blackscholes**

**Swaptions**

**LU**

**FFT**

**Water**

**Streamcluster**

**Sobel**

**Average**

**Figure 12.** Resiliency analysis time for analyzing both Min*EIP* and Ref*EIP*, without and with input prioritization, normalized to analysis time for only Min*EIP*.

# Minotaur Extensions

Minotaur’s techniques can be used to benefit analyses beyond those discussed so far. This section demonstrates Minotaur’s generality by discussing and evaluating two extensions.

## Extension to Approximate Computing

The resiliency analyzer we chose (Approxilyzer [[117](#_bookmark152)]) can also be used for approximate computing. Approxilyzer can identify approximable instructions by grouping error sites differently. Whereas for resiliency we focus on SDC-Maybe and SDC-Bad outcomes (Section [2),](#_bookmark1) Approxilyzer classifies an instruction as approximable if no egregious errors – De- tected, DDC, or OC above a user-defined threshold – are observed for any dynamic instance of that instruction. We use the following user-defined thresholds: 1) for financial applica- tions, errors in individual outputs that are smaller than a cent are tolerable and 2) for other applications, relative errors up to 5% in individual outputs are tolerable. We use the same Min and Ref inputs as in Table [1,](#_bookmark11) and apply random error injection prioritization with early termination (we observe the same trend that randomized error injection ordering performs close to oracle best). For approximate computing, early ter- mination is triggered when an error-injection reveals a PC as non-approximable, indicating that no further injections are required for that instruction.

For approximate computing, Minotaur’s analysis time with- out error injection prioritization is the same as that for re- siliency since we use the same Min and Ref inputs. That is, Min observes an average 4.1X speedup compared to Ref, due to Min’s smaller size (Section [5.1.2).](#_bookmark20) Applying error injec- tion prioritization for approximate computing analysis (where early termination differs compared to resiliency, as described above), Min analysis can be sped up by 4.4X on average, while Ref shows an average speedup of 5.53X. Combining the two optimizations, Min*EIP* shows an average speedup of 18X compared to Ref for approximate computing analysis.

We use an accuracy metric similar to that in Section [4.4,](#_bookmark12) adapted from SDC-PC to Approximable-PC. Min shows very high accuracy – of all the approximable-PCs identified by both Min and Ref, on average, Min identifies 96% while Ref identifies 81%.

## Selective Instruction Analysis

Minotaur can speed up analysis for any desired subset of PCs. For example, a user may desire to analyze the "hot" PCs that account for X% of the dynamic execution. The user can identify the "hot" PCs by first profiling Ref and then switching to Min to run the resiliency analysis. For instance, by targeting the PCs for the top 25% of the dynamic execution in Blackscholes, Min*EIP* speeds up the analysis by 6.8X over Ref for the same PCs and with 100% accuracy.

# Related Work

Minotaur is the first work to systematically adapt and apply software testing techniques for fast and effective resiliency analysis. Section [2](#_bookmark1) describes the key background related work from software testing. We discuss other related work here. **Concepts similar to Minotaur:** We discuss the most directly related works from other domains with similarities to differ- ent concepts in Minotaur. IRA [[58](#_bookmark92)] uses statistical techniques to generate reduced canary inputs that are used to explore different approximation techniques; once an appropriate tech- nique is found, it is applied to the larger input. In Minotaur, the Min input is used not just for exploration, but also for the final resiliency analysis. The Ref input is analyzed only if additional accuracy is desired from multiple inputs and even so, only a subset of Ref needs analysis. A key difference is that IRA targets online production time analysis whereas Minotaur is motivated by offline development time analysis.

DeepXplore [[90](#_bookmark124)] proposes the criterion of neuron cover- age for quantifying the fraction of a deep learning system’s logic exercised by a set of test inputs based on the number of neurons activated by the inputs. Neuron coverage is an orthogonal application-specific input quality criterion that could be employed by Minotaur for appropriate domains.

There are several (static and runtime) approaches in other contexts that share the same goal as Minotaur’s early termina- tion technique, namely, cutting the computation short without sacrificing accuracy [[47](#_bookmark81), [51](#_bookmark85), [108](#_bookmark143), [129](#_bookmark164)]. A recent example is SnaPEA [[129](#_bookmark164)] where convolution operations are terminated early if their output is predicted to be zero.

MinneSPEC [[57](#_bookmark91)] aims to provide reduced input workloads to improve performance (usually runtime of applications), which differs from our objective of uncovering SDC-PCs.

**Hardware resiliency analysis:** Many successful analysis techniques have been proposed to address soft errors in both hardware and software. They can be split into two groups:

1. Techniques that rely purely on static/dynamic program analysis of error-free execution to model error propagation. The widely used ACE [[78](#_bookmark112)] analysis is often used to mea- sure the Architectural Vulnerability Factors (AVF) [[43](#_bookmark77), [68](#_bookmark102),

[78](#_bookmark112), [79](#_bookmark113), [82](#_bookmark116)] of hardware structures. PVF [[113](#_bookmark148)] isolates purely (program or software dependent) architecture-level vulnera- bilities in the AVF; ePVF [[34](#_bookmark68)] further isolates bits that may lead to crashes and achieves a more accurate estimation of the program’s SDC vulnerability. Many cross-layer resiliency solutions have been proposed using these techniques [[1](#_bookmark35), [123](#_bookmark158)]. Shoestring [[35](#_bookmark69)] uses a compiler analysis to identify vulner- able program locations. While fast, these techniques do not precisely model an error’s impact on the execution because they use information from only an error-free execution.

1. Techniques that employ error injections. While typi- cally slower than the previous group, these techniques em- ploy error injections at different hardware and software abstractions [[18](#_bookmark52), [24](#_bookmark58), [31](#_bookmark65), [44](#_bookmark78), [54](#_bookmark88), [64](#_bookmark98), [65](#_bookmark99), [91](#_bookmark125), [109](#_bookmark144), [122](#_bookmark157)]. Some rely predominantly on statistical error injections for vulnerability analysis [[25](#_bookmark59), [41](#_bookmark75), [60](#_bookmark94), [62](#_bookmark96), [118](#_bookmark153)]. Others com- bine program analysis with selected error-injection cam- paigns [[2](#_bookmark36), [49](#_bookmark83), [54](#_bookmark88), [61](#_bookmark95), [108](#_bookmark143), [117](#_bookmark152)]. For example, MeRLiN [[54](#_bookmark88)] applies ACE-like analysis and error pruning to accelerate sta- tistical micro-architectural error injections. It can provide fine- grained reliability estimates for hardware structures and SDC vulnerability estimates for software. VTrident [[61](#_bookmark95)] uses error injections in static instructions to build an input-dependent model on top of Trident’s [[63](#_bookmark97)] error propagation analysis to predict the instruction’s SDC vulnerability. Approxilyzer analysis, used in this paper, is also a hybrid technique, but its primary goal is not a statistical average or probability—it is to determine precisely if/how an error in any specific in- struction will impact the final output. Approxilyzer builds on Relyzer [[49],](#_bookmark83) so Minotaur can trivially apply to Relyzer.

Minotaur is an orthogonal technique that can be used to im- prove many of the above techniques. In general, the concepts of measuring input quality and input minimization are broadly applicable to all techniques that use application inputs. PC coverage as an input quality criterion can conceptually apply to many of the above techniques, but it needs experimen- tal verification. Error injection prioritization can be directly applied to all techniques that use error injections. Input prior- itization is also a general concept that can be applied in cases where multiple inputs are used.

Minotaur can potentially be applicable to other hardware platforms as well. Although this work focuses on CPUs, re- cent resiliency analyses on GPUs [[55](#_bookmark89), [62](#_bookmark96), [83](#_bookmark117)], for example, can potentially benefit from the concepts of Minotaur to im- prove runtime and/or accuracy.

**Approximate computing:** Many techniques have been pro- posed that leverage approximate computing at the level of soft- ware [[8](#_bookmark42), [11](#_bookmark45), [23](#_bookmark57), [71](#_bookmark105), [85](#_bookmark119), [100](#_bookmark134), [106](#_bookmark141), [110](#_bookmark145), [114](#_bookmark149), [121](#_bookmark156), [125](#_bookmark160), [127](#_bookmark162)],

programming languages [[15](#_bookmark49), [20](#_bookmark54), [74](#_bookmark108), [86](#_bookmark120), [87](#_bookmark121), [101](#_bookmark135), [102](#_bookmark136)] and

hardware [[5](#_bookmark39), [11](#_bookmark45), [16](#_bookmark50), [33](#_bookmark67), [42](#_bookmark76), [46](#_bookmark80), [53](#_bookmark87), [56](#_bookmark90), [77](#_bookmark111), [103](#_bookmark137), [105](#_bookmark140), [112](#_bookmark147),

[126](#_bookmark161), [128](#_bookmark163), [133](#_bookmark167)] for improved performance, energy, or reliabil-

ity. Criticality-testing [[3](#_bookmark37), [4](#_bookmark38), [21](#_bookmark55), [75](#_bookmark109), [84](#_bookmark118), [97](#_bookmark131), [115](#_bookmark150)] of approxi- mate computations is important for many domains. Minotaur is an orthogonal set of techniques that can be used to improve many of these analyses that use application input(s).

# Conclusion and Future Work

We present Minotaur, a toolkit to improve the analysis of software vulnerability to hardware errors by leveraging con- cepts from software testing. Minotaur adapts several concepts from software testing for software bug detection to resiliency analysis for hardware error detection: 1) identifying test-case quality criteria, 2) test-case minimization, and 3) two adap- tations of test-case prioritization. We evaluate Minotaur on a resiliency analysis tool, Approxilyzer. Minotaur’s single- input techniques speed up Approxilyze’s resiliency analysis by 10.3X on average while significantly improving SDC-PC detection accuracy (96% vs. 64% on average) for the work- loads studied. Further, Minotaur presents a technique, *input prioritization*, which enables finding SDC-PCs across multi- ple inputs at a speed 2.3X faster (on average) than analyzing each input independently.

Although Minotaur is already very effective, there are many avenues of future work to improve both Minotaur’s effective- ness and its applicability. For example, we plan to explore more input quality criteria (such as path coverage, loop cov- erage, or state coverage [[7](#_bookmark41)]) as well as develop new quality criteria geared specifically towards resiliency (e.g., criteria derived from ACE bits [[78](#_bookmark112)] or PVF [[113](#_bookmark148)]) or towards approx- imate computing (e.g., using parameter range coverage). We also plan to employ more sophisticated optimizers to improve the speed and scalability of the Minimizer along with custom minimization objectives (e.g., number of error-sites analyzed) for faster Mins. We can also improve the Input Selector by tuning analysis speed vs. accuracy for multiple Refs and Mins with variable input quality thresholds.

To widen the applicability of Minotaur, we plan to apply it to other resiliency and approximation analysis techniques proposed in the literature, using a broader range of error models abstracted at lower and higher layers of the system stack than studied here.

Our end goal is a seamless integration of resiliency analy- sis (and hardening) into the standard software development and testing workflow. We believe Minotaur opens up many avenues for further research towards this ambitious end goal. Modern software development practices such as continuous integration encourage developers to continuously commit their code, which would be ideally checked for resiliency, making fast and accurate resiliency analysis techniques such as Minotaur even more important.

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