Recent Papers

Abstract: The 52nd Amendment to the Constitution introduced the Tenth Schedule, also known as the 'Anti defection law,designed to tackle the issue of political defections. This law, enacted by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, has successfully reduced the number of political defections and changes in political loyalties within our legislative bodies. However, it has not fully solved some intricate challenges within Indian politics. The authority of the presiding officer to remove legislators for defection is a point of contention. Over time, expert committees and commissions have found that the presiding officer's role exposes them to political influences, leading to problems like the rejection of disqualification petitions and delays in making decisions. Yet, there have been fewer efforts to address certain legal ambiguities that need clarification. Issues such as the presiding officer's ability to disqualify legislators during legislative adjournments, the handling of disqualification petitions by the presiding officer, the powers of the presiding officer to address petitions about defection, and the consideration of petitions directed to the Secretary of the Legislature are among the unresolved matters under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. This research paper seeks to examine the impact of the Anti-Defection Law on Indian democracy. Written against the backdrop of increasing political defections, this article points out the 'legislative silence,sheds light on specific judicial decisions, and argues for limiting the power of the presiding officerSpeaker to adjudicate on defection petitions.Keywords, Anti-Defection Sue Moto, Legislative Silence, Tenth Schedule, Presiding Officer.

Copyright © 2024 Mr. Suresh Ashok Thorat. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License.